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terer, with knowledge' by him that she took them without her hus-
band's authority, was sufficient to maintain the indictment for felony
against him.
No counsel appeared on either side..
LORD CAMPBELL, C. J.-We are clearly.of opinion that the con-
yiction is right. The general rule of law is, that a wife cannot be
guilty of larceny if sh e takes her husband's goods. Therd is,
legally, no taking, because they are one person in the eyes of the
law. But the rule is subject to this qualification-if she commit
adultery, she has determined her quality of wife, and has no longer
any property in her husband's goods. The prisoner is to be con-
sidered in the same position as if he had taken the goods. If the
wife commit adultery, and take her husband's goods and deliver
them to the adulterer, it is felony in him, because no consent of
the husband can be presumed. • It is a stealing by the prisoner,
who is not at liberty to avail himself of the consent of the wife, as
showing the consent of the "dominus of the goods. The case comes
within express authority originally laid down in Dalton,' and re-
peated in every text-book.
ALDERSON, B.-It is not clear that the adulterous wife may be
convicted, but he who receives from the adulterous wife may be con-
victcd.
-Conviction affirmed.
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in the Circuit Court of the United Statesfor Pennsylvania.
Abandonment in Admiralfy.-Where a vessel is injured and sunk by
collision, in such a place or under such circumstances, that for a small
sum of money in comparison with the value of the vessel and cargo, she
can 'be raised and repaired and the cargo recovered with slight damage, her
owners have no right to abandon her and claim for a total loss. Clarke
vs. The Steamer Fashion.
The doctrine of abandonment as 'connected with cases of insurance, has
not been imported into Courts of Admiralty. .7d.
Dalton's Just. Peace, 363; and seel Russ. Cr. 23, by Greaves, 3d ed.
2 We are indebted to the reporter for the abstracts of 2d Wallace, Jr., -who has
kindly fOrnished us the sheets in advance of publication.
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Admiralty.-The Pennsylvania Pilot Act of March, 1803, which
"obliges" vessels going out or coming into the port of Philadelphia to
receive a pilot, under a "penalty" and "forfeiture" of half-pilotage,
which theact makes a lien upon the ship, and recoverable in the Admi-
ralty, not being, as is decided, compulsory, but optional, the ship need
not take a pilot, if it. prefers to pay the penalty or forfeiture. Hence,
there being a direct privity between the pilot and the ship, the latter
is liable in Admiralty for damage caused by his acts. iSmith vs. The
Creole and The Sam1,son.
The lien for wages of a seaman, who is himself a part owner of the ves-
sel on which he serves, is discharged by a sheriff's sale of her, on execu-
tion against her owners. And this, although as a general principle, a
sheriff's sale of a vessel does not discharge the sailor's lien upon her.
Gallatin & Wood vs. The Pilot.
Apency.-Where "a larger vessel-a ship-is in tow of a small one-a
steam tug-the latter is'in law regarded as the servant of the former;
and being thus its agent, and so bound to obey its orders, is not responsi-
ble for damage in the proper course of the employment. Smith vs. The
Creole and The Sampson.
Capias and Satisfaiendum.-Where one, having arrested his debtor
defendant on a ca. sa., sets him at liberty on certain terms, at his ingtance,
it being "expressly acknowledged" by the' defendant that this is done
"for his accommodation, without any prejudice whatever to arise to the
plaintiff's right by the enlargement" as aforesaid, "or otherwise however;"
the debt is paid at law. No further execution of any sort can be issued
there. And the agreement having been drawn and signed by the plain-
tiff's own attorney, a learned and able cotnsellor at law, a Court of Equity
will not interpose to enjoin the defendant from pleading this discharge as
payment, by allegations in a. bill demurred to, that there was either a mis-
take common to both parties as to the effect of the agreement; or else.
that the plaintiff not knowing its effect, while the defendant did know it,
it would be a fraud in the dbfendant now to profit by the plaintiff's mis-
conception or ignorance of what he was doing; and set up at law the pay-
ment by his liberation on the ca. sa. Magniac vs. Thomson.
Challenge of Jurors.-One who being summoned as a juror in a cage,
where treason was charged to have been committed-stated, on being.
challenged, that he had read the newspaper accounts of the facts at the
time, and come to his own conclusions-had made up his mind, that the
offence was treason, though he had not expressed that opinion,-nor appa-
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rently formed nor expressed an opinion that the defendant was or was not
engaged in the offence-is incompetent to sit as a juror. Walsh's Case.
One who has formed a conditional, but not an absolute opinion on the
law of treason: e. g., who iays he can't understand how treason can be
committed against the inited States, if such and such facts do not con-
stitute it, is competent .to sit as a juror, if he says that, on being in-
"strueted by the Court, that the opinion 'is erroneous, such opinion will
cease to influence him as a'juror. Reynold's Case.
the prosecution have no right to ask a juror, whether he has so made
up his mind [on facts?] as that it could not be altered in the course of a
trial; there being no obligation on the prisoner to take upon him the
burden of changing the juror's mind to the extent, that even if this ques-
tion were answered negatively, he might have to do it, to procure an ac-
quittal. Whitman's Case.
One who, wit~hout forming or expressng any opinion as to the matter to
be tried, had "formed an opinion that the laws had been outraged," is
competent. Brinton's Case.
One who had "certainly expressed an unfavorable opinion towards the
course of these gentleman,"-that is a party of persons with whom the
prisoner agreed in opinion; the person summoned being sensible of no
such bias as would affect his opinion, as juror; having neither formed nor
expressed any opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the lirisoner, or of
thd other persons charged to liave participated with him in the offence; not
presuming to be a j~udge whether the offence was treason; knowing none
of "these gentlemen" individually, and meaning to express nothing more
than an opinion against the transaction, and that the persons engaged in
it ought to be punished, is competent. Lyons's Case.
One who had formed, though not expressed, (I some opinion" relative to
the matter to be tried-who had made up his mind as to the subject of trea-
son, provided the facts were proved, but not as to the guilt of the prisoner,
was recommended by the Court to be withdrawn; the trial being one for
treason; the definition of which word in application, though not abstractly,
had- not yet been perfectly settled by judicial decision; anvd the Court
consideringthat hisanswerindicatedthat he might have "made up'his mind"
on the law of treason or made it up differently from what the Court would
decide. Smit s Case.
The Court, in the early empaneling of jurors, where the number un-
challenged are yet great-or in particular trials, or in particular circum-
stances,-as where public opinion has been abused by the party press--
or where there is reason to suppose that the opinion of the neighbor-
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hood from which the jurors came, may be biased-will allow more search-
ing and particular questions to be put to the persons summoned as jurors,
than it would afterwards, where it appears that a jury, such as would be
entirely desirable, cannot be had; or where the case has not excited pub-
lic interest. It will seek in the first instance, and as far as practicable, to
have a jury not only free from legal bias, but even from any even light
impressions about the case at all. United States vs. Hanwa$,.
Collision.-Although the Court cannot establish a rule to bind vessels
navigating the high seas to carry signal lights, yet, where one vessel does
so and another does not, the Court, in case of a collision, will go some
way to treat the dark boat as the wrong doer. Barque Delaware vs.
Steamer Osprey.
The Court going in advance of hitherto adjudicated cases, would seem
to enforce the obligation upon all boats navigating bays and rivers, not
only to show lights on an approach, but to carry them constantly. Id.
A vessel which moors'alongside of another at a wharf or elsewhere,
becomes responsible to the other, for all injdries resulting from her proxi-
mity, which human skill or precaution could have guarded against. ran-
tine vs. The Lake.
The schooner L., on entering the dock at high tide, was directed by her
consignees to be moored to an adjoining wharf of which they weie les-
sees, outside of The X. J., a smaller vessel. There was not in the dock
during part of the ebb, enough water for The L., though there was. suffi-
cient for The l. J. ; of which fact the consignees, but not the master of
The L., were aware. No objection was made at the time from The Al.
J., nor any caution given. On the tide receding, The L., on this account,
and from the bottom of the dock being banked up in the middle from ac-
cidental causes, (with which the consignees were also acquainted,) 'areened
over on The M. S., crushing lier timbers, and causing her to fill and sink:
A. soon as the danger was perceived, a measure of prevention was sug-
gested by The l. J., but rejected as useless. Held, that The L. was
bound to know the depth of water in the ddck, or at any rate was respon-
sible for the directions of the consignees, who had full knowledge; and
that she had not taken proper precaution before or after theinjury. The
L. condemned in damages.' Id.
Besides the costs of repairs in this case, charges for wharfage while re-
pairing; for the time of one of the owners, and of the crew in raising
and clearing out the injured vessel; and for the loss of profits to the ves-
sel while sunk, and during the time she was being repaired, allowed by
the Court in the assessment of damages. Id.
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Comity between States.-The exercise of Admiralty jurisdiction in suits
by foreign seamen for wages, is matter of comity rather than of duty; and
generally speaking, is exercised only under such circumstances as might
infer the presumption of a request from the foreign State; as, for example,
where a voyage is ended or broken up, and the seamen discharged; or
where there is strong reason to believe that there would be a failure of
remedy, in case the mariners were compelled to await an opportunity of
obtaining redress in their 6wn courts. Gonzales vs. Minor.
0onsu.-A consul of a Foreign Power, though not entitled to repre-
sent -his sovereign in a country where the sovereign has an ambassador, is
entitled to intervene i~r all subjeats of that Power interested: and though
he should not set forth the particulars of his claim,, still it will do if they
can be fully gathered from the allegations of the libel and the case it sets
forth. Robson vs. Tke Huntress.
Copyright.-A prose translation (having no qualities of a paraphrase)
of a copyright prose romance, which the author had himself caused to be
translated in a way he liked, and copyrighted, is not an infriigement of
the author's copyright of the original. Stowe vs. Thomas.
Counsel and Counsel Fees.-Admitting, for the sake of argument, that
the allegation of a mistake of the law would give jurisdiction to a court
of equity in a common case, and be a ground for relief;, yet the Court
will not listen to the allegation that a member of the bar has made such a
mistake. It can hardly be successfully averred even by the party whose
counsel, he would coifess, has made it. Magniac vs. Tlomson-
On a habeas corpus, in a question of conflict between State and Federal
process, counsel have no right to appear in defence of the State process,
unless in some way authorized by the State or its proper officers; and,
after return made, the Court refused to hear as counsel a member of the
bar, who showed no such authority; nor any authority beyond that of the
person executing the State writ. Ex parte Jenkins.
In a prosecution in the Circuit- for treason, in the alleged commission
of which a citizen of a State, without the Circuit, had been assaulted and
killed, the Court approves of the presence of special counsel from that
State; as well counsel coming here by order of the governor of the State,
as counsel employed by the friends of the deceased. United States vs.
Hanway.
Although, perhaps, in aggravated cases of appeal, where the judgment
of the District Court in Admiralty is affirmed, the Court might. add by
